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ABSTRACT
A new model is proposed for enhancing patient safety
using market-based control (MBC), inspired by successful
approaches to environmental governance. Emissions
trading, enshrined in the Kyoto protocol, set a carbon
price and created a carbon market—is it possible to set a
patient safety price and let the marketplace find ways of
reducing clinically adverse events? To ‘‘cap and trade,’’ a
regulator would need to establish system-wide and
organisation-specific targets, based on the cost of adverse
events, create a safety market for trading safety credits
and then police the market. Organisations are given a
clear policy signal to reduce adverse event rates, are told
by how much, but are free to find mechanisms best
suited to their local needs. The market would inevitably
generate novel ways of creating safety credits, and
accountability becomes hard to evade when adverse
events are explicitly measured and accounted for in an
organisation’s bottom line.
In 1999, the US Institute of Medicine published the
landmark report ‘‘To Err is Human,’’ which out-
lined a strategy to reduce preventable medical error
by 50% in 5 years.
1 More years have passed, and we
have yet to meet that target.
2 One major unan-
swered question is how pressure and encourage-
ment are to be applied to improve patient safety.
Key contenders are litigation,
3 safety training,
4
systems change,
5 legislation,
6 information technol-
ogy
7 and accreditation.
8 Pay-for performance (P4P),
the linking of reimbursement with adherence to
safety and quality measures, has received much
recent attention and can produce modest to good
improvements in quality,
91 0 but there remain
difficulties:
c P4P targets a few behaviours or outcomes for
reward, and can distract from non-targeted
outcomes, focus on what is easily reportable or
measurable
11 and create uncertainty when one
set of targets is replaced by another.
12
c Clinical practice is highly localised, shaped by
differing needs, practices, resources and cultural
norms, and the variability of individual
patients. Selecting meaningful, broadly applic-
able process or outcome targets is thus difficult.
Further, targeting specific behaviours is a top-
down strategy that does not adapt to local
needs.
c There is no avenue for third parties to take a
stake in quality improvement, hindering inno-
vation and the harnessing of additional
resources and skills unavailable in the clinical
setting.
A PROPOSAL FOR SAFETY UNDERPINNED BY
MARKET-BASED CONTROL
Given our slow progress in improving the quality
and safety of care, and the limitations of P4P, we
propose a potentially radical new model for
governing the safety of health services, inspired
by successful environmental approaches. The US
Federal Clean Air Acts of 1970 and 1990 set
pollution-reduction targets but did not mandate
how they were met. A central innovation was
emissions trading, which allowed states to meet
targets in highly flexible ways.
Emissions trading is also central to the Kyoto
protocol, which has set a carbon price and created a
market where carbon credits are traded between
those who have reduced emissions below targets,
and those who have not. While Kyoto has had little
time to demonstrate its effectiveness, the US Clean
Air Acts succeeded in dealing with acid rain, and
the challenge of chlorofluorocarbons. There thus
seems to be merit in using market-based mechan-
isms for other public good goals.
There are clearly similarities and differences
between environmental and health regulation.
Notably, both healthcare and the environment
are public goods and involve the private and public
sectors as participants. In contrast, a system like
Kyoto is designed to engage nation states in a
global regulation task, whereas health services
could conceivably be regulated at a national, state
or regional basis. Indeed, many of the most
pressing challenges of the Kyoto protocol seem to
have arisen for geopolitical reasons, including the
inability of Kyoto nations to compel other nations
to join the system, and the trade-offs that have to
be accepted to get nations to sign, for example the
divisions between how developed and developing
nations are treated in the Protocol.
Emissions trading is however not a one-off
governance model but rather is an example of
market-based control (MBC).
13 MBC systems were
inspired by economic marketplaces but are now
understood to be a general approach to optimising
system responses to varying circumstances. MBC is
thus a specific mechanism for system governance,
not to be confused with ideological stances like
‘‘the free market.’’ MBC has been used widely and
with much success, for example for the allocation
of resources in communication networks. More
generally, markets are used in many unexpected
ways, such as the prediction of avian flu outbreaks
and vaccine effectiveness. Defining attributes of
MBC include decentralisation (there is no need for
anyone to understand all the parameters being
optimised) and distributed allocation of resources
(individual agents make local decisions about
allocation). Few measures are needed globally
beyond the main controlling signal, be that price
or quantity. Consequently, while we can draw
inspiration from individual implementations of
MBC, such as the Kyoto mechanism, it is probably
more instructive to look at the more general
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best suit the needs of healthcare, based upon first principles
analysis and experimentation.
DESIGNING A PATIENT SAFETY MARKET—‘‘CAP AND TRADE’’
So, can MBC be used to reduce avoidable patient harm? This
has never been tried before. A safety-trading market might look
something like this:
1. Set a patient safety price. A value is set on each preventable
adverse event (PAE), based upon its estimated cost to the
system.
2. Establish system-wide targets. Using an estimate of the
current baseline PAE rate, set a global target and
progressively reduce this over time.
3. Allocate organisational targets. For clinical organisations,
estimate their current baseline PAE rate, and provide them
with ‘‘credits’’ equal to a reduced target. Organisations
must find ways to meet that target.
4. Create a safety market for trading safety credits.
Organisations that reduce PAE rates below set targets
have surplus credits, which they can sell. Organisations
that miss targets must purchase market credits to meet
target, or pay the regulator for credits at a set price. Failure
to comply generates a large penalty.
5. Police the market through an auditing mechanism. Audit
need not be universal but will need to be visible, credible,
perhaps random to ensure compliance and responsive to
attempts to distort, cheat or evade.
6. Allow for certification and audit of authorised third-party
organisations. New organisations can independently initi-
ate verifiable harm reduction projects to generate new
credits.
Figure 1 shows a possible safety market structure. The players
include a regulator, who polices market mechanisms, health
service organisations that meet harm reduction targets and
authorised third-party organisations. The marketplace allows
for the verifiable exchange of credits.
MEASURING AND PUTTING A PRICE ON SAFETY
Central to the safety market are pricing and measurement
mechanisms. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) has defined 20 hospital and seven area-level safety
indicators,
14 and P4P programmes lead the way in identifying
meaningful safety process and outcome measures, although this
is an ongoing research area.
MBC would require such diverse safety indicators to collapse
into a few, and perhaps just a single control variable. Kyoto
targets, for example, are expressed in a single unit, a tonne of
CO2, which is associated with a ‘‘carbon price’’ but actually
covers a basket of six separate greenhouse gasses, accounting for
92% of global warming.
15 Other gases are excluded because of
concerns about their measurement. A weighting index converts
the impact of each gas into a CO2 equivalent, so that they are
interchangeable on the market. The resultant tradable com-
modity is sometimes known as an emission reduction unit
(ERU).
Can we develop a similar tradable patient harm reduction unit
(HRU) (fig 2)? Could we identify a ‘‘basket’’ of leading PAE
classes to cover a good proportion of clinical practices, and
associate each class with a common measure of resource
consumption, which can be assigned a cost? Recent work
suggests that such an approach is indeed possible. We now
know that a wide variety of PAE causes can be collapsed into a
smaller basket of ‘‘natural’’ outcome categories, each category
associated with a cost (additional days length of stay).
16
Runciman et al’s analysis of 15 000 hospital admissions also
found that 25% of PAE resources were expended on the 11 most
frequent PAE categories (table 1), 50% by the top 45. Any such
basket of PAEs is bound to be revised as we better understand
how it relates to safety outcomes.
There are several benefits of a composite indicator like the
HRU over simpler more reductionist measures such as the
Hospital Standardized Mortality Rate (HSMR). First, an HRU
based, say, upon length of stay is a much more fine-grained
measure of clinical practice. Many of the adverse events in
table 1, for example, would not translate into significant
changes in a service’s mortality rates. Second, the composite
nature of the HRU allows it to be more specifically targeted to
the practices of different sectors, via the basket of PAEs chosen
for inclusion. For example, the PAE basket for primary care is
likely to be quite different to that used to monitor care in the
acute hospital sector. Such differences may also come some way
to explaining why a single measure like the HSMR is neither a
consistent nor a reliable measure of quality.
17
ESTABLISHING A SAFETY BASELINE AND SETTING TARGETS
Both P4P programmes and carbon markets have explored
different approaches to establishing performance baselines and
targets. Absolute targets set identical goals across all organisa-
tions—for example, each hospital must reduce HRUs by 5000
Table 1 Top ‘‘natural’’ categories of adverse event in hospital, and costs in terms of additional length of stay
(from Runciman et al
16)
Top principal adverse event category
Mean additional
length of stay (days)
No of events in
each category
Total no of extra
days in hospital
Ongoing pain/restricted movement following back surgery 22 22 474
No, delay, inadequate investigations ischaemic heart disease 13 34 451
Wound infection following peripheral procedure 11 29 314
Incisional hernia: postprocedural 10 27 271
Postoperative bowel obstruction/adhesions 13 21 271
Injury due to fall in nursing home 12 19 219
Failed/blocked/ruptured/aneurysm, vascular grafts 13 17 215
Recurrent incisional hernia 9 20 190
Pulmonary embolism postoperatively 8 22 185
Wound infection following abdominal/retroperitoneal/pelvic
procedure
5 35 178
Catheter-related urinary-tract infection 5 37 174
Each of these outcome categories can arise from a wide variety of different causes.
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relative to a variable that models the intensity of clinical activity
(eg, number of patients), and provide a more flexible mechanism,
normalised to different scale organisations or patient loads.
Relative targets can be set using multiple variables. For example,
casemix modelling of individual organisations could adjust for the
relative complexity of patient conditions or services provided.
There are risks and benefits to the different approaches that
need to be considered when selecting baseline and target
mechanisms. Experience with Kyoto suggests that fast-growing
nations prefer relative targets, shrinking ones absolute targets.
18
A related phenomenon is ‘‘grandfathering’’ or zero-price
allocation of credits to existing organisations based upon their
current performance. An organisation with poor safety perfor-
mance could be relatively advantaged over an organisation with
lower PAE rates, if past reductions at the safer organisation are
not taken into account. Relative targets may mitigate against
this but have their own limitations. As organisations grow,
baseline PAE estimates also increase, generating new credits for
expected additional PAEs. If the goal is to reduce the absolute
number of PAEs, then intensity targets may be problematic. A
number of studies show that, rather than issuing credits,
auctioning them and recycling of revenue through tax reduction
may lead to economic gains.
Concentration targets can define the period over which
absolute or relative targets are met, and contraction and
convergence targets allow organisations with widely different
starting-points time to converge, first on absolute targets, and
then switch to relative targets. The length of commitment to
targets before baselines are re-estimated is also an issue.
Experience with climate change suggests that 5 years best fits
the life-cycle of policymakers.
Once trading is enabled, local auditing is needed to measure
whether targets are met. The responsibility for developing and
instituting such monitoring, reporting and verification systems
will require thought.
BENEFITS, RISKS AND POSSIBILITIES
We anticipate many benefits from a patient safety market.
Organisations are given a clear policy signal to reduce PAE rates,
are told by how much but are free to use whatever mechanisms
best suit their local needs. The reward for excellent organisa-
tions that beat targets is that spare credits can be sold, yielding a
financial reward that can be reinvested in improving care.
However, are we allowing unsafe organisations to buy their
way out of trouble? In reality, an organisation that buys credits is
not rewarded for poor performance but pays a transparent
financial penalty. It would be difficult to sustain an organisation
that has to spend money to prop up poor practice. The incentive
to change is direct and unavoidable, and accountability hard to
evade when PAEs are measured in the bottom line.
Figure 1 Governing a patient safety market: how the major players might align.
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the market. Businesses may emerge to exploit ways of
minimising PAEs. A manufacturer of computer prescribing
systems could audit their impact on medication errors, and the
number of safety credits generated if a system were installed.
Remotely monitoring the health status of older people at home
could demonstrate a reduction in falls due to early intervention
generating safety credits. Entrepreneurs could pay consumers to
wear medication allergy armbands by demonstrating the bands
reduce PAEs due to inappropriate medication. Brokers could help
organisations find credits, agree a price, arrange their purchase
and meet regulatory requirements. Aggregators could help
smaller organisations with similar safety profiles to work
together, sharing experiences, minimising resource utilisation
on harm reduction projects and maximising their ability to
generate credits.
To develop and test this new approach, we must understand
the impact of the different possible market settings and ensure
that benefits of error reduction strategies outweigh costs. We
need to recognise that there is not a single market design but
that a broad spectrum of design and implementation options are
available, ranging from lighter weight models through to large,
expensive and potentially heavily bureaucratic implementa-
tions. The evidence for the most effective market settings and
designs will come from a number of sources. First, we need to
learn from existing MBC approaches such as carbon trading.
Careful consideration needs to be given to current experience
with baseline-setting mechanisms, the regulator’s role, auditing
and verification procedures so that consensus can be reached on
these issues by the healthcare community, as well as on the
structure of the marketplace itself (will it be a registry, a
clearing house or a trading floor?). The market should ensure
that large organisations do not distort credit prices. Some
strategies will require early retirement of capital stock and
generate short-term losses, or acquiring expensive new systems
like electronic health records, while benefits are longer term.
Exploring the costs and benefits of different points in this
large space of policy and implementation options is unlikely to
be feasible through large-scale trials alone. In silico computer
simulations offer a powerful alternate experimental model,
which can help test out these many different market
variations quickly and cheaply.
19 Once there is sufficient
evidence from simulations and other analyses that a particular
MBC model shows promise in principle, the next step will
undoubtedly require one or more small pilot studies. Pilot
studies would be followed by larger-scale trials, for example
using cluster randomisation, at a regional level among
hospitals, to ensure that we are making evidence-based policy
about harm reduction.
OVERCOMING OBJECTIONS
We anticipate objections. Should we leave something as
important as safety to a market, when governments have so
clear a responsibility? Is it right to treat safety as a tradable
commodity? One response is that health systems have tried
many other strategies, but the patient safety problem seems
entrenched and policy-resistant.
20 The point is not whether
commoditisation of safety leaves us feeling uncomfortable but
whether it works. Others may point to criticisms of Kyoto that
suggest better abatement can be achieved through taxes, or new
technologies, and that too is a debate worth having.
Another major source of objection is the potential for MBC to
introduce complex measurement, verification and trading
systems, with significant compliance costs and with the risk
of building a bureaucracy that is expensive, and could become
disconnected from, and in conflict with, the clinical services it is
meant to be helping. With much evidence now pointing to the
need for clinicians to be actively engaged in quality improve-
ment for it to be successful, the design of any MBC
administrative structure needs to ensure it is well suited to
the culture and nature of clinical services. However, it is also
worth reminding ourselves of the current state of affairs. It has
been estimated in the USA that adults receive recommended
care just over half the time (55%)
21 and for children, just under
half the time (46%).
22 Composite indicators for safety and
quality that track improvement over time show that the rate of
response to current safety and quality programmes is unac-
ceptably slow.
23 Clearly, poor quality and unsafe care remains a
profound cost to the health system. As long as the benefits
significantly outweigh costs, we believe that the size of any
MBC system should not of itself be an issue.
So, in short, market forces, aphoristically labelled ‘‘the
invisible hand’’ by Adam Smith, can be extremely efficient
and powerful drivers of change. MBC may be the key to
effective healthcare reform, promoting safety and error reduc-
tion, and may become a widely used governance mechanism,
directed at many aspects of healthcare service delivery.
Funding: This research is supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council
(LP0775532), and NHMRC Program Grant 568612.
Competing interests: None.
EC declares that he originated the safety market concept, participated in the
developing the concept and the writing of the paper. JB declares that he participated
in developing the safety market concept and the writing of the paper.
Figure 2 Calculating safety credits. Two separate clinical organisations
institute different harm-reduction projects, aimed at reducing locally
relevant causes of regulated preventable adverse event (PAE) classes.
Project impacts in reducing the incidence of PAEs are audited, and then a
weighting index converts PAE reductions into a common costable
metric, such as days in length of stay prevented. The aggregate cost of
all projects for an organisation, expressed as the total number of harm
reduction units (HRUs) achieved, is then compared with the
organisation’s target HRUs. Surplus HRUs generate tradable credits, to
be bought by organisations that miss targets.
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